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ABSTRACT: The ATLAS detector at the Large Hadron Collider at CERN is one of the most ad-
vanced detectors for High Energy Physics experiments ever built. It consists of the order of ten
functionally independent sub-detectors, which all have dedicated services like power, cooling, gas
supply. A Detector Safety System has been built to detect possible operational problems and ab-
normal and potentially dangerous situations at an early stage and, if needed, to bring the relevant
part of ATLAS automatically into a safe state. The procedures and the configuration specific to
ATLAS are described in detail and first operational experience is given.
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1 Introduction
ATLAS [1] is a general-purpose high energy physics experiment at the Large Hadron Collider
(LHC) at CERN, Geneva, Switzerland. The detector is located in a cavern 100 m underground and
is not accessible during operation. Because of this inaccessibility and of its very large size (the
biggest high energy detector ever built, 46 m long and 25 m in diameter) and complexity, advanced
control and safety systems are needed.
The normal operation of the experiment is supervised by the Detector Control System
(DCS) [2], which is implemented as a distributed system of about 200 PCs. The task to detect
severe safety hazards like fire, smoke, flammable gas, etc., which may even put human lives in dan-
ger, is fulfilled by the CERN Safety Alarm Monitoring (CSAM) [3]. Between these two systems
lies a gap, the protection of equipment in abnormal and potentially dangerous operating conditions.
This is covered by the Detector Safety System (DSS), which is the subject of this paper.
The definition of the DSS was established together by the four LHC experiments in the frame
of the Joint Controls Project (JCOP) and the implementation was done by the CERN controls group
IT/CO [4].
In the following, first the requirements are summarized and then an overview of the architec-
ture and its implementation is given. The main part of the paper describes the usage of the DSS
by ATLAS, in particular its configuration and the operational model. In the end some operational
experience is reported.
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2 General requirements and architecture
In general, when designing a safety or control system a choice has to be made concerning the
conflicting requirements:
a) Extreme robustness and reliability, predictability, 100% available;
b) Flexibility, ease of reconfiguration, ability to perform complex operations.
The technical implementation depends very much on these aspects. The tasks mentioned above
are such that the CSAM belongs to case a) and relies essentially on hard-wired connections. The
DCS, which falls in category b), has been implemented mainly by higher level software running on
PCs. The DSS, however, combines requirements from both a) and b), which strongly influenced
the choice of its implementation.
For high energy physics experiments additional challenges need to be met such as dealing with:
- Extreme conditions (e.g. underground, confined spaces, extreme temperatures or pressures);
- Complex detector structures acting individually as well as together;
- Very sensitive sensor elements.
The detailed requirements of the DSS are:
- High availability; the system must operate continuously. During scheduled maintenance pe-
riods of DSS special arrangements must be made to ensure the safety of the ATLAS detector;
- Robustness of operation; the system must have a certain level of redundancy built-in in order
to avoid single points of failure. Continuous internal diagnostics are also essential;
- Stand-alone capability; there must be no influence of other control systems on the DSS. It
should have its own sensors detecting hazards and actuators to bring equipment in a safe
state. It should be independent from external services such as computer networks or general
electricity distribution;
- Flexibility to allow evolution with time; the commissioning of the different detector elements
extends over a time period of about three years and supervision of components needs con-
tinuously be added without disruption of the supervision of already running equipment. The
safety procedures will need to be adapted with the operational experience gained;
- Self-documentation; it must be possible to see online not only the status of the DSS, but
to also access all definitions. All changes of the set-up and all actions of the DSS must be
automatically documented.
A set of recommendations for the usage of the DSS in ATLAS has been laid out in [5]. The
overall strategy of the DSS is to put (parts of) the ATLAS experiment into a safe state in case
an abnormal and potentially dangerous situation arises. These shutdown procedures shall not be
harmful for the detector. To this end there must not be any need for further actions by an operator.
– 2 –
2009 JINST 4 P09012
However, a human intervention will always be necessary to analyse and to remove the fault and
to bring the equipment back in operation, i.e. the DSS would never switch equipment back on
automatically. The definition of DSS actions should be independent of the operational status of the
experiment such as data taking, maintenance, etc., as equipment safety is independent of this.
The DSS consists logically of three parts:
- Sensors to detect an abnormal and potentially dangerous situation;
- Alarms, created by a programmable logic using the sensor signals;
- Actions to put equipment in a safe state.
The implementation is factorized in two components:
- Front-End (FE) to which the sensors are connected, where the alarms are established, and
which triggers the actuators;
- Back-End (BE) with operator interfaces, allowing configuring the FE, to view the DSS status,
and to reset alarms and actions.
The FE consists of several I/O stations which are connected by redundant cabling to the su-
pervisor, which is implemented using two redundant Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC). All
safety-related functions are executed in the FE and “positive safety definition” is used throughout,
which means that in case of missing information (e.g. sensor disconnected) or internal DSS prob-
lems the relevant actions will be executed. All FE equipment runs from Uninterruptible Power
Supplies (UPS) and does not need any computer network. A “gateway” PC connects directly to the
PLC and provides the connection to BE PCs via the ATLAS control network. These BE stations,
distributed at several locations, allow easy and user friendly setting up and operation of the DSS.
3 Implementation in ATLAS
The DSS architecture as described above is identical for all four LHC experiments, whereas the
actual configuration is tailored according to the specific needs and risks of each detector.
3.1 Sensors and actuators
Potential hazards in ATLAS are overheating, either due to faults in the equipment itself or because
of malfunctioning of the related cooling system, fire, and leaks of gases and cryogenic liquids.
Dedicated sensors have been installed to detect such possible dangerous situations at an early stage.
An air sampling “sniffer” system collects the air from many locations inside the detector via
139 pipes and analyzes it for presence of smoke, flammable gases, CO2 and for deficiency of oxy-
gen. Additional flammable gas detectors are placed close to the end-cap muon chambers and inside
their gas distribution racks. Oxygen deficiency detectors are positioned underneath the detector and
in the trenches, where heavy gases like argon or CO2 would accumulate in case of a leak. Smoke
detectors control the ambient air of the different experimental areas, counting rooms and service
zones. The racks housing the detector electronics are equipped with a thermal switch which cuts
directly the power to this rack in case of overheating, and with smoke detectors connected to the
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DSS. A status line from each cooling system is connected to the DSS in order to signal any mal-
functioning. In addition, for several subdetectors and for some common services, signals indicating
abnormal behaviour of their equipment are connected to DSS. Examples are vacuum problems in
the cryogenic systems or a ramp-down of the magnet systems.
Digital sensors are implemented as an opto-isolated current loop, which has to be closed to
signal normal conditions. Analogue sensors supply a standard 4 mA–20 mA signal. Most of the
sensors connected to the ATLAS DSS are of the digital type, while a few analogue sensors provide
temperature, flow, and pressure information of critical zones. Following the principle of “positive
safety”, disconnection of a sensor always results in an alarm condition. The actuators are normally
implemented as opto-coupled switches and, if higher currents are needed, as relays. Again, to
achieve “positive safety”, these switches are closed for normal operation and trigger an action on
the equipment connected by opening. Details of the input and output channels are listed in table 1.
3.2 Front-End system
The overall layout of the ATLAS DSS is shown in figure 1. The Front-End equipment is organized
in Detector Safety Units (DSU), located in the different electronics rooms and is interconnected
by redundant cabling using the PROFIBUS protocol. Two DSU are placed in each of the three
counting rooms underground USA15L1, USA15L2 and US15L2 and one in the surface computer
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Figure 1. Overall hardware layout of DSS in ATLAS.
building SDX1. This distribution has been chosen to match the I/O requirements at each location
and to minimize the cable lengths. In case of further needs more DSU can be added up to a total
of 16 units.
Each DSU is a standard electronics rack, divided into two parts. The lower part holds the
patch panels for the connection of sensors and actuators and the upper part contains I/O modules,
the equipment for communication and a local UPS. This UPS has autonomy of at least one hour
and is connected to the secured electricity network, which is backed up by a Diesel generator.
Each DSU can be equipped with a mix of input and output modules according to the needs at each
location. A DSU comprises typically the order of 300 digital I/O channels and a small number of
analogue input channels.
The DSS PLC consists of two redundant CPUs which are located in the DSU in SDX1 and in
USA15L1. These locations — one on surface and one underground — have been chosen to be as
independent as possible. Both CPUs run identical programs to analyze all sensor information and
to trigger the corresponding actuators. It takes typically 500 ms to cycle over all sensors, depending
on the number of I/O channels and the complexity of the processing. Therefore the reaction time
of the DSS to any abnormal situation is guaranteed to be less than one second. The internal states
of the two CPUs and the results of the processing are compared at various steps, and, in case
of problems detected, the faulty CPU would shut down. The other one would continue normal
operation of the DSS. The DSU in SDX1 also contains the gateway PC which interconnects the
PLCs with the DSS BE PCs.
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3.3 The Alarm Action Matrix
The rules for the conditions to trigger actions are defined in the Alarm-Action-Matrix (AAM): all
DSS input signals can be combined by logical operations to trigger any actuator in a matrix-like
fashion. This proceeds in the following steps. First, a sensor indicating a fault sets an alarm. As
an option, it can be requested that the sensor is in fault state for up to 30min in order to filter short
fluctuations or to allow short interventions which should not affect the operation of the systems.
The alarms triggered by several sensors can be combined using logical operations (e.g. “and”, “or”,
“n out of m”) in order to trigger an action. Before its execution, i.e. setting the DSS output, a delay
of up to 30min can be programmed. This is used for either sequencing actions within the DSS or
for enabling the DCS to execute procedures before the DSS takes the action.
3.4 Back-End system
The Back-End (BE) system has two main tasks: configuring the DSS and serving as user interface
(UI) for operations. As it is not directly involved in the safety procedures proper, its implementation
does not need the same level of redundancy and robustness that the FE requires. The hardware
platforms for the BE are PC. One machine serves as gateway for the communication between the
PLC and several machines provide the User Interface (UI). All PC run the Windows operating
system and use the commercial controls software PVSSII [6], which is also the basis of the DCS.
The BE software [7] is provided by the central JCOP team, including the user interface and
tools to program the AAM. The ATLAS safety experts provide the configuration and the synoptic
views of the ATLAS detector.
Setting up an AAM element consists of defining a logical relationship between input and
output channels of DSS to establish alarms and to trigger actions. Before being accepted and sent
to the PLC, all settings are checked for consistency. In this way the BE plays a role for safety as
well. Once accepted the settings are stored online in an Oracle database for documentation.
The information about sensors triggered, alarms and active actuators is displayed by the UI
using both tables and synoptic panels, which are specific for the ATLAS experiment. An active
alarm also triggers a sound in the ATLAS control room, sends an e-mail and an SMS to the different
subsystem experts, creates an entry in the logging database, and triggers a telephone service, which
keeps calling people from a predefined list until someone has been reached and accepted to follow
up the problem. The e-mail and SMS notification use external mailing, which is independent from
the DSS alarm settings in order to minimize interacting with the DSS proper.
Backup and archiving functionalities are handled by the BE part of the system. The former
allows restarting the system using the last valid AAM configuration, e.g. in case of an internal sys-
tem failure, and the latter allows displaying the up-to-date definition of the AAM. The system also
logs any alarm generated and all actions taken. The database can be inspected using the GLANCE
tool [8], which also allows viewing the history of definitions and which describes the procedures
for the operator to follow in case of DSS actions and the corresponding recovery procedures.
The BE sends the information about DSS alarms and actions over Ethernet using the CERN
proprietary Data Interchange Protocol (DIP) to the DCS, which distributes it to all subdetector
systems in order to enable them to execute shutdown procedures. In this way the relevant DSS
information is also injected in the overall ATLAS status and alarm display, which is handled by
the DCS. There is no software information going into the DSS from any systems in order to ensure
that the DSS is as independent as possible.
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4 System configuration
Setting-up sensor signals, alarms and actions in the DSS requires well defined procedures and
interaction between with the DSS team and the different subdetector experts.
As a first step a risk analysis is performed for each subdetector, covering the risks coming
from the subdetector itself as well as all risks created by neighbouring systems, missing services or
general environmental problems. This analysis includes also possible risks the subdetector under
inspection may present to other systems. The next steps are to define sensors which are able to
detect such situations as early as possible and to define procedures to bring the subdetector in
a safe state. These findings are documented in a report which has to be approved by the DSS
team and the subdetector experts. After the implementation of the sensors and actions and the
programming of the AAM a test covering the full chain from sensor to action is performed and
this action is then documented as commissioned. Any further change needs new approval of the
subdetector responsible and of the Group Leader In Matters Of Safety (GLIMOS) and possibly
new commissioning. All these steps are documented in the CERN Engineering & Equipment Data
Management Service (EDMS).
5 Operation
If an alarm is triggered, all corresponding DSS actions programmed in the AAM are executed and
the detector is put in a safe state. A detector expert has to analyze the reason(s) of the failure, re-
move the fault and start the recovery procedure, together with the Shift Leader In Matters of Safety
(SLIMOS). For each DSS action a corresponding recovery procedure is defined and documented
in GLANCE.
The SLIMOS acknowledges the alarm when the reason for it is understood. After this ac-
knowledgement the alarm is automatically removed from the alarm list, once the cause of the alarm
is no longer present. Finally, after consultation with relevant (sub-) system expert, the SLIMOS can
then proceed to acknowledge the action. After this step the subdetector can be brought back into
operation. This may need complex procedures and may also require interaction with the GLIMOS
and the ATLAS shift leader.
As mentioned above the DSS has to be continuously operational. A service team provides an
on-call service to cure faults of the DSS itself and it also takes care of the regular maintenance
of the DSS.
6 Performances and operational experience
The DSS is in operation since 2006, when the installation of the ATLAS detector has started. It
has been continuously growing as detector elements were added and has by now reached its current
implementation with 615 sensor inputs, 570 alarms, and 343 actions defined. The important feature
of un-interrupted operation of the DSS during the process of adding further actions has always been
fulfilled. Not a single unexpected behaviour of the DSS has been observed to date after more than
three years of operation. Whenever an abnormal situation was signalled to the DSS, it took the
corresponding action(s) as defined. In accordance with the concept of “positive safety” there were
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three occurrences where the DSS has correctly shut down the full ATLAS experiment because of
an “internal” failure: once the DSS emergency button was pressed by mistake, once the DSS lost
power because the back-up generator did not start up, and once because the redundant cabling was
broken by mistake when adding a new DSU. However, these “unnecessary” actions did not cause
any harm to the detector hardware of ATLAS.
During the set-up phase of the DSS substantial functionality has been added to the BE system,
also enhancing its user-friendliness. The most important additions concerned logging in the data
base for both documentation purposes and keeping track of operations.
Initially, the biggest part of the alarms which the DSS needed to deal with was caused by
front-end cooling problems — around 70 alarms in the first two years. The actions triggered by
these alarms were switching off power in electronics racks, interlocking detector power supplies,
etc., thus preventing damage to the equipment due to overheating. Other actions were triggered
by anomalies in the environmental conditions, e.g. smoke caused by welding work. Since ATLAS
operations started, most DSS actions are triggered by operational problems with the gas.
7 Conclusions and outlook
In the more than three years of operation of the DSS in ATLAS its sound design and implementation
has been fully proven. It fulfills all requirements, has never failed, and has always taken the actions
that had been defined, thus guaranteeing the safe operation of ATLAS. The procedures of defining
and maintaining the definitions of actions are well established.
The separation into a FE and a BE part is vital for the safe operation. The FE has — at any
time — a valid definition of the AAM and is hence able to guarantee autonomously the safety of
the ATLAS detector. The ability to add definitions to the system without interrupting it turned out
to be crucial during the installation of the detector. Due to its data driven architecture and pre-
dictable response time no bottlenecks can occur, even when all elements of the AAM are solicited
concurrently.
The decision to design and build a system for all LHC experiments in common did not only
save implementation effort, but also allowed exchange of experience and will be beneficial for
future maintenance. The DSS is flexible enough to be configured to fulfil the needs of each experi-
ment. Purpose-built user interface panels can be easily prepared and further synoptic views will be
added to help the operator.
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